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This paper examines three types of industrialization that have occurred in East Asia: 
the Japanese, Chinese and generic Asian models. Industrial policies in Japan and 
the Republic of Korea (ROK) initially protected local companies from foreign 
investors by imposing high tariffs on foreign investors. But Japan began introducing 
liberalization policies to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 1960s, and the 
ROK began to welcome foreign technology in the 1970s. Meanwhile, the governments 
of the ASEAN countries and Taiwan established export-processing zones (EPZ) to 
invite FDI by offering preferential treatment, such as tax deductions and 
exemptions. China adopted similar industrial policies and also established EPZs, 
attracting the capital and know-how of multinationals and thereby strengthening 
the international competitiveness of local enterprises. This paper reaches the 
following three conclusions. First, it would have been difficult for East Asian 
countries to grow without FDI. Second, central governments were a crucial factor in 
these countries’ growth strategies. Third, EPZs offering preferential treatment can 
effectively enhance aggregate growth in developing countries, and the Asian 
experience shows that this strategy can be applied to other countries that satisfy 
certain preconditions. 
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Introduction 
 
What are the roles of governments in industrialization? Can industrial policy 
effectively foster domestic firms and enhance economic growth? Most East Asian 
economies began growing rapidly in the latter half of the 1980s, which lasted until the 
Asian currency crisis in 1997. The East Asian Miracle published by the World Bank in 
1993 pointed out common factors such as trade liberalization and openness to foreign 
direct investment, but it did not focus on how industrialization policy differed among 
the countries of East Asia. 
Can we classify typical patterns of industrialization policies for economic growth in 
East Asia? Komiya, Okuno and Suzumura (1988) found that industrial policies helped 
Japanese companies become competitive with multinational corporations by cushioning 
the dynamic inefficiencies of Japanese markets through the protection of infant 
industries. Hamada (1974) studied export-processing zones (EPZ) and found that their 
establishment was a key factor in the introduction of foreign direct investment (FDI). 
However, no paper has classified growth patterns to clarify the differences in the 
industrialization policies of individual East Asian countries. 
This paper classifies East Asian growth patterns into three models: Japanese, Asian 
and Chinese. Tables at the end of the paper help to show the differences in the 
respective models’ institutions, regulations and laws. 
The Japanese model was based on government-guided industrial policy, under which 
the government selected key industries, gave them preferential treatment including tax 
deductions and exemptions, and tried to help them become competitive with foreign 
multinational corporations. The government intervened in markets to complement goods 
and services that could not be supply efficiently (Komiya, Okuno, and Suzumura 
[1988]). 
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The Asian model was centered on the central government establishing EPZs to 
attract FDI. Foreign companies enjoyed the same preferential treatment that domestic 
firms did under the Japanese model, but were requested to export competitive products 
to the global market. 
The Chinese model was similar to the Japanese model, except in its use of FDI. The 
model intended to foster domestic companies as so-called “pillar industries” by guiding 
industrial policy and forming alliances between domestic companies and foreign 
multinationals. The most typical case was seen in China’s automotive industry, where 
the government selected eight domestic firms, gave them preferential treatment and 
permitted each company to make alliances with up to two foreign companies, such as 
GM, Ford or Citroen. 
This paper clarifies the differences and similarities of the three models and 
elaborates the policy implications drawn from the analysis. 
The key lessons derived from the East Asia experience are as follows: first, FDI 
played a key role in developing East Asia's international competitiveness; second, 
governments set industrial policy not only by protecting domestic firms but also by 
inviting foreign investors; and third, special economic zones such as export-processing 
zones were used to attract foreign investors. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 compares the various industrialization 
policies seen in East Asia. Section 3 explains Japan’s industrial policies. Section 4 
shows how FDI played an important role in the Asian EPZ model. Section 5 divides 
Chinese industrial policy between 1979 and 2002 into four sub-periods and explains the 
characteristics of each one. Section 6 compiles the findings of this paper. 
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1. Comparison of Industrialization Policies in East Asia 
 
 There are two entirely opposite two concepts of industrialization policy in East Asia. 
As shown in Figure 1, the neoclassical concept is based on market competition without 
government intervention, while the right side of Figure 1 show government intervention 
to protect and support infant industries. One concept is based on the importance of 
market competition and the other on government intervention. 
 The neoclassical concept maintains that price competition in the private sector 
results in the most efficient allocation of resources from the point of the Pareto 
efficiency, or Pareto optimality The World Bank implements structural adjustment 
programs in developing countries to create competitive markets by requesting 
governments to abolish price controls. Government regulations that prevent market 
competition are moderated and eventually removed. 
 The importance of government intervention is seen in Japanese industrial policy 
after World War II. The government directly controlled production, distribution and 
pricing to achieve an efficient allocation of resources after the war. This policy 
supported the development of industries and made a great contribution to postwar 
economic recovery. In the latter half of the 1980s, when socialist countries suffered 
from economic problems and shifted to market economies, many countries like Russia 
and Vietnam tried to apply similar government-led industrial policies.  
 However, ASEAN countries from the latter half of the 1980s combined market 
competition with government intervention. This is the Asian model (see Figure 1.). The 
Asian model gives preferential treatment to enterprises to develop their international 
competitiveness. Economic growth from the latter half of the 1980s was the result of the 
introduction of foreign investment in export-processing zones under export-promotion 
policies. Foreign investment was introduced in Thailand through export-processing 
zones in Malaysia through free-trade zones. Although The prototype Asian model was 
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seen in Taiwan from 1965, in Table 1. 
 Japan and ROK in Table 1 are examples of government intervention. The difference 
from the Asian model is that the industrial policies in Japan and ROK included 
protection against foreign imports in the form of high tariffs and restriction of foreign 
investment. These policies were helpful in protecting domestic industries from foreign 
companies, but they also resulted in internationally uncompetitive companies. 
Protectionist policies were applied from the 1950s, but the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund promoted structural adjustment programs to make markets 
free and competitive by the 1980s, which made it difficult for countries supported by 
these bodies to maintain protectionism. 
 Table 1 compares the growth patterns among Malaysia, Taiwan, ROK, Japan and 
China. Japanese industrial policies from 1945 to 1960 mostly depended on domestically 
sourced managers, capital, technology, capital goods and parts and components, 
although a high percentage of the technology was transferred from foreign countries. 
High customs duties were applied to protect domestic firms. The ROK applied the same 
policies to protect its domestic industries, but the difference with Japan was that the 
ROK depended more foreign countries for capital, technology and parts and 
components. This was partly because the ROK had to accelerate its economic growth to 
catch up quickly in the 1970s, since the level of per-capita income was low and the 
world economy was being liberalized. 
 Malaysia’s economy grew rapidly from 1986 to 1996 by introducing foreign capital 
through free-trade zones. Growth was brought about by the liberalization of trade and 
capital policies that did not require protectionist measures. Since foreign multinationals 
were allowed to enter Malaysia with their management, capital and parts and 
components, growth was swiftly accelerated.  
 When China began reforming and opening up the country in 1979, it implemented 
industrial policies similar to those adopted by Japan and the ROK, but it also introduced 
 5
policies adopted by Malaysia to establish free-trade zones, which it called special 
economic zones and economic development zones. The government then undertook 
economic liberalization, partly due to requests from the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organization (WTO), resulting in the 
introduction of foreign investment.  
 
 
2. Industrial Policy in Japan 
 
Referring to Table 2, this section analyzes Japan's industrial policies and makes clear 
the following two facts: first, policies before the 1960s protected domestic companies 
by imposing high tariffs on imports; and second, Japan could no longer implement such 
policies from the 1970s because the globalization of the world economy forced the 
Japanese economy to liberalize and make its domestic companies internationally 
competitive. 
 The priority-production method that was applied immediately after World War II was 
taken as an emergency measure during a very chaotic period. The government directly 
controlled production, including raw material allocation, pricing, financing, 
price-support subsidies and the rationing of imported materials. The policy gave priority 
to the production of coal, iron and steel. 
 Thereafter, in the 1950s, production was rationalized through the government's 
indirect control of raw materials, production and distribution. The policy concentrated 
on capital financing. Since the aim was to support domestic industries, capital financing 
was targeted at iron and steel, electric power and shipbuilding. 
 Industrial policy shifted to government coordination of the private sector in the 
1960s. During this time, however, the government came under pressure to liberalize the 
economy, so it had to take account of international competition. As a result, scale of 
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economy became a key focus. The need for mergers and acquisitions led to government 
coordination of investment, production and pricing in the private sector. Not all of these 
measures, however, could be called "liberalization." From the 1970s, the machine and 
electronic industries were also promoted, beginning their rise to prominence in 
industrial Japan. Income differences between large enterprises and both small and 
midsize enterprises suggested the existence of a dual economy, so the government 
began to also support the latter beginning in the 1960s, which contributed greatly to 
their development of technologies and resulting growth from the 1970s. 
 In the 1970s, the main role of the government became long-term vision planning. By 
the 1980s, however, the tend toward economic liberalization made it difficult for the 
government to intervene for the purpose of supporting domestic industries. Therefore, 
the government shifted to long-range planning to encourage the development of 
high-technology industries. 
 One of the major differences between the Japanese and Asian models is that Japan 
focused on production rationalization and capital financing/loans for strategically 
targeted enterprises, while the Asian model used tax breaks to attract foreign capital. In 
the 1980s, when multinationals were attempting to lower costs, tax breaks helped China 
to lure foreign capital, including Japanese factories. Japanese enterprises were 
particularly attracted to China's economic development zones, including  
the high-technology industrial development zones, as well as the special economic 
zones.  
 In the 1960s, Japan’s participation in the OECD and the IMF Article 8 scheme put 
pressure on the country to liberalize its industrial policy. Enterprises with sufficient 
economy of scale could achieve international competitiveness, so mergers and 
reorganization became a strategic measure to increase the size of key enterprises. This 
situation was similar to that of China in the 1990s, when the government tried to 
enhance international competitiveness by enlarging the size of key enterprises through 
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the merger and reorganization of state-owned enterprises. The Chinese policy to 
encourage technology innovation among small and midsize enterprises (SMEs) also 
matched the Japanese strategy of the 1960s. Once these measures are fully implemented, 
the role of the Chinese government will decrease significantly and its industrial policy 
will shift to strategic long-term planning. 
 
A. Transition to Market Economy to Mid-1960s: Gradualism 
 
Japan's transition from a controlled economy to a market economy can be 
characterized as gradualism rather than shock therapy. The sequencing of the 
transition was as follows: 1) strengthening of supply side (priority production 
program), which included private-sector development (dissolution of big business 
groups), macroeconomic stabilization (Dodge Line) and structural adjustment; 2) 
industrial rationalization; and 3) cooperation between government and business. 
Both industrial rationalization and government-business cooperation are applicable 
to current developing countries. 
 
1) Strengthening Supply Side (1946 – 1948) 
 
To reconstruct the Japanese economy, it was deemed necessary to strengthen 
the coal and steel industries. The policy was to give priority to the steel industry 
in the allocation of coal, and then give priority to the coal industry in the 
allocation of steel. The program’s immediate objective was to strengthen the 
capacity of basic raw-material supply. 
This policy was executed under the direct control of the government. The 
measures included allocation of raw materials, financing from the 
Reconstruction Finance Bank, price-gap subsidies, price controls and allotment 
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of imports. 
In 1947, the production of steel and coal hit a record high in volume in Japan, 
and the production of mining and manufacturing industries increased by 23 
percent. In l948, growth increased even further to 33 percent. 
 
a) Private-Sector Development (1946 – 1947) 
To promote competition in the private sector, the zaibatsu (big business 
groups) were dissolved and an antimonopoly law was enacted. The 10 
groups that were designated for dissolution included Mitsui, Mitsubishi, 
Sumitomo and Yasuda, and reorganization orders from General Headquarters 
(GHQ) were issued to l8 companies. For instance, the two giant trading 
firms Mitsubishi Corporation and Mitsui & Co., Ltd., were divided into l20 
and 170 companies respectively. Through this process, family-controlled 
zaibatsu (multiple enterprises) ceased to exist. Competition was further 
promoted by the enactment of the antimonopoly law. 
 
b) Macroeconomic Stabilization (1948) 
GHQ announced nine economic-stabilization principles in December 
1948, and upon the arrival of a mission headed by Joseph Dodge in 1949, 
effective demand was cut by imposing a reduced government budget. This 
policy was called the “Dodge Line.” Dodge reformed the taxation system, 
reduced subsidies greatly, attained a balanced budget and started a return to 
market principles. As a result, hyperinflation was controlled and the 
economy moved toward macroeconomic stabilization. 
 
c) Structural Adjustment (1949 – 1951) 
To reintroduce a market economy, it was necessary to lift price controls 
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and to set and unify the exchange rate. About 63,000 items were under price 
control at the end of 1948, but this was reduced to about 80 by the end of 
1951. The multiple exchange rates that existed for price-gap subsidies were 
unified, and a single exchange rate of 360 yen to the U.S. dollar was 
established in 1949 to make international trade possible. 
 
2) Industrial Rationalization (1951 – 1960) 
 
Industrial policies were introduced in this period. Key measures included 
preferential taxation, including special depreciation (1951), import tax 
exemption for important machinery (1952) and export income-tax deduction 
(1953). Other measures included low-interest credit allocated by the Japan 
Development Bank (which was established in 1951 to replace the 
Reconstruction Finance Bank), technology import approvals (based on 
foreign-currency allocations) and import quotas for the steel industry (1950). 
A distinctive feature in the 1950s was that the government targeted priority 
industries and designated priority enterprises. The process was controlled by the 
government to some extent, but was not under government’s direct management. 
Financing, or the allocation of credit, was particularly important because it 
aimed at fostering domestic capital. Financing from the Japan Development 
Bank played a key role in supplying funds to basic industries in the early stages. 
 
3) Cooperation between Government and Business (1960 – 1970) 
 
Trade liberalization measures were implemented throughout the 1960s. 
Liberalization of trade and foreign exchange was announced in 1960, and in 
1964 Japan joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
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Development (OECD) and lifted foreign-exchange restrictions. 
Trade liberalization was carried out in three steps from 1961 and was 90 
percent complete by 1964. Liberalization of capital was initiated in 1967 and 
finished in 1973. An event that reflected the economic climate of the time was 
the House of Representatives' rejection of a bill to to create priorities in taxation 
and financing for automobiles, specialty steel and petrochemicals. 
As liberalization progressed, the promotion of heavy and chemical industries 
was carried out in the 1960s. Cooperation and coordination between government 
and business helped to make enterprises more competitive in the face of 
liberalization. Macroeconomic management was based on the theories of Keynes 
(investment to produce savings) and Harrod Domar (private investment in plant 
and equipment to create effective demand with a multiplier effect while also 
increase supply capacity). 
 
4) Industrial Policy since Mid-1960s: Focus on Longer Term 
 
a) Changes in Industrial Policy 
Industrial policy in Japan changed dramatically in the middle of the 
1960s (and from the 1970s for the computer industry). Measures to restrict 
imports and promote exports were gradually lifted and protectionist policies 
were ended. Tariff rates were reduced to the point where today Japan has a 
lower average tariff level than both the United States and the EU. 
In recognition of its increasing role in the world economy by the1980s, 
Japan began to vigorously promote imports, which included shifting the 
focus of the Japanese External Trade Organization from promoting Japanese 
exports to foreign imports. Other policies promoted international cooperation 
in joint research and economic development, and investments to help 
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stimulate the world economy. 
 
b) Basic Attitude behind Industrial Policy 
The basic attitude behind Japan’s industrial policy has been to support the 
free-trade principle. For instance, several Japanese industrial sectors, such as 
textiles and rubber footwear, came under severe pressure due to imports 
(particularly from East Asia) around 1980, but the government did not 
extend help in the form of import protection.  
Japan’s industrial-policy tools are indirect and inductive in nature, and 
are designed to encourage competitive private firms to maximize initiative 
and entrepreneurship. However, where imperfections exist in the mobility of 
capital and labor, information flow, etc., and where external economies and 
diseconomies cannot be adequately addressed by market mechanisms alone, 
Japanese industrial policy helps to provide a framework that enables market 
forces to function better. 
 
c) “Soft Technology” of Public Administration 
The formulation of long-range vision, such as the Technopolis Law of 
1983, is basic to the designing of industrial policy. There exist various kinds 
of visions: some cover overall industrial structure while others relate to 
specific problems, such as industrial adjustment or energy. Visions are not 
formulated by the government alone, but through councils composed of 
representatives from various sectors, including financial institutions and 
other industrial circles, academia, media, labor, small business, consumers 
and local pubic entities (Industrial Structure Council, etc.). In the 1980s, the 
effort involved not only economists but also political scientists, sociologists, 
engineers, historians, and writers.  
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The drafting of long-term perspectives is crucial to government-business 
cooperation and constitutes one of the main roles of the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). Having a vision reduces uncertainty 
about the future, invigorates the market and promotes competition. Since 
METI is not in a position to intervene and control the activities of private 
companies, it plays the role of advisor and consultant. METI’s budget is 
relatively small (see Table 5) and its legal authority is not necessarily 
powerful, so it leverages the “soft technology” of public administration, as 
reflected in its future-oriented vision and consensus-based policymaking.  
Master visions are formulated at the beginning of each decade (Table 6 
summaries the visions in past decades). The vision of MITI (METI’s 
predecessor) in the 1970s indicated the importance of the computer industry 
or “mechatronics.” Based on this vision, industrial colleges quadrupled the 
number of students in their data-processing departments between 1970 and 
1979. The vision also focused on “knowledge intensification,” which 
referred not only to the computer industry, but also a new approach to coping 
with the challenges of raising productivity. The goal was to emphasize 
knowledge factors in every industrial field. While the vision was unable to 
predict the dollar shock of 1971 or the oil shock of 1973, knowledge 
intensification helped in the recovery from these crises. 
One of the slogans of MITI’s vision for the 1980s was “technology-based 
nation.” MITI recognized that technology creation was essential both for 
Japan to contribute to the world economy, as well as for the economic 
security of the nation. According to a widespread opinion, however, there 
would be no more technological revolution. Furthermore, Japan’s 
expenditures on research and development as a percentage of GNP were 1.7 
percent in l977, the lowest among the advanced nations (Germany was 2.3 
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percent, United States 2.2 percent, Britain 2.2 percent and France l.8 
percent). 
MITI’s vision targeted the raising Japan’s R&D spending to 2.5 percent 
by 1985 and 3.0 percent by 1990, and ultimately this is what happened. 
Moreover, the government’s share (27 percent in 1977 compared with 
around 50 percent in other advanced nations) decreased still further to 20 
percent in 1990, with private companies increasingly shouldering the burden. 
The “technology-based nation” concept set a marker for Japanese business 
and vitalized their commitment to an all-new age of high technology, 
proving that “the vision is mightier than the budget.” 
 
 
3. Industrial Policy in East Asia 
 
This section shows that export-processing zones in most Asian countries contributed 
to enhanced economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s, prior to the Asian financial crisis 
in 1997. EPZs are industrial zones where tenant companies receive preferential 
treatment, such as tax deductions or exemptions, to import materials that were later 
exported in finished or semifinished products. The degree to which taxes are lowered 
depends on the percentage of a company's total production that is exported. 
In the Asian model (see Table 3), governments had two basic roles: promotion of 
international competitiveness and market intervention. Wholly owned foreign 
subsidiaries were permitted to entered the local market to help develop the international 
competitiveness of the local industry. Foreign investors entering new countries often 
face problems finding good partners, so approval of 100% ownership by most ASEAN 
countries was a critical factor in attracting foreign capital, since the entrants did not 
have to search for capital partners. 
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Other methods for enhancing international competitiveness were also used. These 
included the depreciation of the local currency to reduce labor costs in foreign currency 
terms, and the deduction of local content requirements to enable foreign investors to use 
better quality components. 
Governments intervened in the market by means of tax deductions and/or 
exemptions. Tax holidays, for example, exempted enterprises from paying corporate 
income taxes in the first five years of profitability. Another policy was to exempt tariffs 
on imported capital equipment and components. In addition, many countries gave 
foreign investors incentives to export their products. For instance, tax breaks were given 
to enterprises that exported at least 80% of their production. The Asian model was 
particularly effective in attracting foreign investors to economic development zones in 
China.  
Notice, however, that China employed two types of policies. the Asian model of 
economic development zones, and government-guided policy. The next section explains 
how the latter differed in China and Japan. 
The prototype EPZ was seen in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, which became a model for EPZs 
in Malaysia, Thailand and China's Guangdong Province. The model is suitable for other 
East Asian countries, provided that they satisfy the preconditions of political and 
macroeconomic stability and public security. Under this model, the quasi-public sector 
provided production sites, that is, industrial zones with well developed infrastructure, 
and the government selected key industries in which to provide preferential treatment to 
foreign investors. A high export ratio was the only condition required for companies to 
receive incentives, such as 100% ownership and preferential taxation. 
But simply offering EPZs is not enough unless multinational corporations are 
actually attracted to expand their production overseas. The most important incentives 
are those that help multinationals reduce costs, namely, low wages, attractive exchange 
rates and low taxes. Cost reduction had a decisive impact on the decisions of Taiwanese, 
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ROK and Japanese companies to invest overseas from 1985 to 1990 (see regression 
analyses presented in Appendix). 
In the following sections, a number of cases are presented with respect to 1) 
deregulation of foreign investment; 2) preferential treatment and other measures; 3) 
industrial parks; and 4) designation of specific sectors. It is also shown that FDI 
increases rapidly in response to such policies, with beneficial effects on exports, 
employment and economic growth. The ASEAN countries and ANIEs (Asian Newly 
Industrialized Economies) adopted import-substitution industrialization policies that 
proved successful in the early stages of their economic development (see Figure 2). But 
they were soon faced with saturated markets because of their relatively small markets 
and low income levels. As a result, the ASEAN countries shifted toward 
export-promotion from the mid-1980s (see Figure 3). 
 
A. Malaysia: High Growth, Personnel Development and Free-Trade Zones 
 
1) Import substitution (1957 – 1967) 
 
Malaysia implemented a moderate first phase of import substitution after its 
independence in 1957. The World Bank proposed a policy of replacing imports 
with domestic products, and the government generally followed the suggestion, 
although it did not control exchange rates, imposed few limits on import 
volumes and set relatively low import tariff rates (see Kohama, Yamazawa, and 
Hirata [1987]). 
 
2) Export promotion (1968 – 1979) 
 
The government had been emphasizing import substitution for consumer 
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goods, but the domestic market was too small to support this policy. As a result, 
an export-promotion policy was adopted with the enactment of an 
investment-incentive law in 1968. The law identified industries that exported 
finished and semifinished goods as qualifying for preferential treatment, which 
centered on exemption from corporate taxes for five to eight years. Other 
exemptions included the development tax (5 percent of profits), the 3 percent 
excess-profits tax and the 40 percent corporate tax. In addition, in 1971 a law 
introduced free-trade zones, which essentially functioned as export-processing 
zones. 
 
3) Import substitution revisited (1980 – 1985) 
 
Beginning in 1970, the Malaysian economy shifted its dependence from 
rubber and tin to palm oil and crude oil (by 1985, crude oil accounted for 30 
percent of Malaysian exports). Amidst this shift, the government implemented 
the second phase of its import-substitution policy in 1980. The plan to shift to 
heavy industries was launched by the establishment of the Heavy Industries 
Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM), and investment priority was shifted to steel, 
cement, automobiles, chemicals and other such industries. But the country’s 
macroeconomic stability worsened dramatically in the early 1980s: the fiscal 
deficit was 20 percent of GNP and the external current-account deficit amounted 
to 10 percent of GNP. The country’s foreign debt kept growing until it exceeded 
40 percent of GNP in 1986, and the debt service ratio rose to more than 15 
percent. In 1985, the country suffered from its first year of negative economic 
growth since 1961. 
 
4) Export orientation through FDI (1986 – 1997) 
 17
 
Negative economic growth forced Malaysia to strengthen its export-oriented 
industrialization. The nation’s previous policy, called the New Economic Policy 
(or Bumiputra Policy), had been implemented after ethnic riots in 1969. One of 
the primary goals had been to restructure society to lessen economic disparity 
among ethnic groups and regions, so the priority was equity rather than 
efficiency. In 1986, however, a new export-promotion law shifted the priority to 
efficiency, including authorization of wholly owned foreign subsidiaries, 
launching a period of deregulation, privatization and economic liberalization. 
Deregulation of FDI was an epoch-making shift because it permitted total 
foreign ownership of companies under certain conditions (see Aoki (1994). The 
conditions were either that the company export more than 80 percent of its 
products, or export more than 50 percent of its products while employing more 
than 350 full-time regular workers. 
About this same time, Japanese companies were starting to shift production 
to other countries because of the appreciation of the Japanese yen. This shift 
induced massive FDI by Japanese firms, a development which the Japanese 
termed an “historic opportunity.” In addition to Japan, foreign investors from 
Taiwan and ROK also invested in Malaysia's free-trade zones during this period. 
One major aspect of Malaysian industrialization was the designation of 12 
industries as leading sectors in the country's industrial master plan of 1986. The 
non-resource industries were electric/electronic manufactures, textiles/garments, 
machinery, transport equipment and steel, and the resource industries were wood 
processing, rubber manufacturing, palm oil manufacturing, food processing, 
chemicals/petrochemicals, nonferrous metals and nonmetal manufactures. 
The Malaysian economy entered a high-growth phase in 1988. The transition 
to this phase did not follow the conventional "flying geese" pattern of gradual 
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development from textiles and processing to lesser labor-intensive industries. 
Instead, the government established a high-tech sector in a single stroke (see 
Aoki [1994], p. 51. As a result, Malaysia began to record high rates of economic 
growth after 1988, with per-capita GNP reaching US$2,500 in l991. 
At this point, the focus of industrialization shifted to the development of 
human resources and the fostering of "supporting" (supplier) industries. Concern 
had been mounting in regard to the economy’s shortage of labor due Malaysia’s 
small population of about 18 million. Once the shortage of skilled and 
semiskilled workers became acute, it became necessary to develop human 
resources to make up for labor shortages. In the early 1990s, Malaysia also 
supplemented its human-resource development measures with foreign labor 
from Indonesia, Bangladesh and other countries. 
Another problem was the weak link between local firms and the foreign 
companies operating in free-trade zones, but this was overcome by connecting 
the two entities through the development of supporting industries. By 
successfully dealing with this problem, and its domestic labor shortage, 
Malaysia managed to maintain high economic growth in the first half of the 
1990s. 
 
B. Thailand: Successful Introduction of FDI 
 
Thailand’s industrial modernization got under way with a series of 
liberalization steps taken in the late 1950s. These steps included abolishing a 
multiple exchange-rate system and doing away with large national corporations. 
Subsequent industrialization was carried out in four phases (see Ikemoto and 
Wonghanchao [1994]). 
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1) Import substitution (1960 – 1971) 
 
Thailand’s policy to replace imports with domestically produced goods was 
made explicit with the implementation of laws for new tariffs and 
industrial-investment promotion, both of which took effect in 1960. As a result, 
tariff rates were raised to protect domestic industries and preferential tax 
treatment was given to importers of machinery, raw materials and other 
intermediate goods for industrial use. From 1962, preferential conditions were 
authorized for priority industries, such as exemption from corporate income tax 
for five years; exemption from import tariffs on machinery, parts and raw 
materials necessary to set up ventures; and reduction or exemption from all or 
partial import tariffs on other investment assets for five years. 
The import substitution policy achieved a certain success: some Thai-made 
products fully satisfied domestic demand in the early 1970s (Institute of 
Developing Economies(1994)). On the other hand, the import of intermediate 
and capital goods increased as industrialization progressed, resulting in a sharp 
rise in the trade deficit from 1967 through 1970. As a result, the nation was 
forced to switch to export promotion. 
 
2) Export promotion (1972 – 1976) 
 
In 1972, the industrial investment promotion law was again amended and a 
new export promotion law took effect. The former reduced or exempted import 
tariffs and operating taxes for export-oriented corporations and increased the 
deduction of export sales from taxable income. The export promotion law 
offered reimbursements for tariffs on imports of raw materials used in exports; 
tax credits for tariff payments and operating taxes on raw materials used for 
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exports; and financing for export operations. 
The policy changes were not implemented smoothly, however, in part 
because of social unrest in the country. 
 
3) Import substitution revisited (1977 – 1982) 
 
In 1976, a coup led by Admiral Sagat Chalawyu succeeded and the following 
year the new administration formulated the country's fourth five-year plan, 
aimed at the stabilization of the Thai economy. It allowed the protection of 
heavy industries that were producing intermediate and capital goods. At the 
same time, the administration placed priority on the development of exports, 
agro-industry, regional industries and small businesses. It also launched the East 
Coast Development Program as a large-scale regional industrial plan. 
 
4) Export promotion through FDI (1983 – 1996) 
 
In the fifth five-year plan introduced in 1983, the government specially 
emphasized FDI and allowed export companies to be fully owned by foreign 
investors. The Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand constructed industrial 
estates and the first EPZ was established at Bangchan near Bangkok in 1970. 
The Lad Krabang Industrial Estate was completed in 1979 as an EPZ and was 
filled up by 1987. In addition, the government divided the country into three 
regions and encouraged investment in specific areas. 
From 1987, Thailand began achieving high economic growth rates of 9.5 
percent, 13.3 percent, 12.3 percent and 11.6 percent, respectively. During this 
period, drastic deregulation was implemented in the automobile and textile 
industries. The high rates of economic growth exposed various problems in the 
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Thai economy, including infrastructure deficiencies, human-resource shortages, 
an income gap between urban areas and rural villages and the need to promote 
small businesses. 
 
C. Indonesia: Structural Adjustment under Deregulation 
 
1) Import substitution (1966 – 1982) 
 
Compared with Thailand and Malaysia, Indonesia launched its import 
substitution policy rather late. Once the policy was launched, however, it was 
implemented for a relatively long time. The first phase lasted from 1966 to 1979 
and can be subdivided into two sub-phases: 1966–1973 (introduction of selected 
FDI) and 1974–1979 (intensive protection of domestic industries) (see Oguro 
[1995]). The foreign-investment law took effect in 1967, but from 1970 onward 
the government grew more selective in choosing foreign partners, so preferential 
treatment was extended only to foreign investors in priority industries. 
Furthermore, from 1970 to 1973, some 44 industries were made ineligible to 
receive foreign investment. 
Meanwhile, oil revenue soared as oil prices rose in 1973. The period from 
1974 through 1979 saw intensive protection of domestic industries. In 1974, the 
government decided to expand the scope of foreign-investment regulations to 
additional industries and to nationalize foreign-affiliated companies. This second 
phase of import substitution lasted from 1979 to 1983. The government tried to 
nationalize 52 basic industries, such as petrochemicals and basic metals, along 
with steel, shipbuilding, aerospace and automobiles, but the plan was 
discontinued from 1981 when oil prices fell in 1981. 
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2) Structural adjustment (1983 – 1996) 
 
The rupiah’s drastic devaluations in 1979, 1983 and 1986 compelled 
Indonesia’s switch to an export-oriented policy. In 1983, the country began to 
implement structural adjustments recommended by the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank, aiming to receive lending from these two institutions. 
Malaysia differed from Indonesia in this regard because it did not receive 
lending to carry out structural adjustment measures.  
Deregulation was implemented in all sectors of the Indonesian economy, 
including finance, import-licensing and other systems. In the years since, the 
country continued to implement deregulation measures. Two export-processing 
zones were established, in 1986 and 1992, and the government allowed the 
establishment of foreign-owned companies in limited areas. Unlike Malaysia 
and Thailand, however, foreign investors were not offered preferential taxation, 
financing, etc. 
In 1994, the government authorized 100 percent ownership by foreign 
investors, which led to a significant increase in FDI and faster economic growth. 
 
D. ROK: Toward an Advanced Industrial Nation (See Okuda [1993]) 
 
1) Import substitution (until 1961)  
 
In the post-Korean War recovery period until 1961, the ROK government 
implemented an import substitution policy, mostly for consumer goods, with a 
priority on industries such as sugar, fertilizer, spun yarn, cement and glass. But a 
saturation point was soon reached because of the small size of the domestic 
market and constraints on economic growth due to a current-account deficit. 
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Therefore, the country was forced to change its policy. 
 
2) Export orientation (1962 – 1980) 
 
The ROK’s industrial policy was shifted to export promotion to develop 
labor-intensive exports such as textiles and plywood. During this period, which 
lasted until 1980, the policy was implemented according to the country’s 
economic development plan to promote exports, as follows: 
 
● first five-year plan (1962?1966): priority on exports 
● second five-year plan (1967?1971): consumer goods exports and 
replacement of intermediate-goods imports with domestic goods 
● third five-year plan (1972?1976): industrialization centered on heavy and 
chemical industries 
● fourth five-year plan (1977-1981): development of knowledge- and 
information-intensive industries 
 
Priority industries were defined for each five-year economic plan. The first 
plan focused on exporting manmade fiber yarn, fertilizer, cement and refined oil 
products. The second plan focused on exporting consumer goods and on 
replacing intermediate-goods imports with domestic products, with an emphasis 
on the petrochemical, medicine and machinery industries. Also, the Massan 
export-processing zone was established during this plan, in 1970. The third plan 
was centered on the heavy and chemical industries, with an emphasis on 
machinery, steel and shipbuilding. However, the heavy industrialization plan 
was not implemented smoothly, leading to both positive and negative results. 
The fourth plan placed emphasis on industrial machinery, steel and electric 
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equipment/parts, as well as related fields such as knowledge- and 
information-intensive industries. Annual per-capita GDP rose from about $100 
in 1960 to more than $1,000 in 1977, and then to $1,800 in 1981. 
 
3) Toward maturity (l980 – 1984) 
 
The ROK economy experienced negative growth in 1980, following many 
years of steady high growth. The downturn came as a result of a combination of 
events, including political turmoil after the assassination of former President 
Park, the second oil shock of 1979, a bad rice harvest and rising foreign debt due 
to overdependence on foreign loans. To improve the current-account balance, the 
government implemented measures to cool down excessive consumption, 
resulting in a relatively low average annual growth rate of 8.4 percent in the 
1980s. 
 
4) Economic boom (1984 – 1989) 
 
In the next period, the ROK enjoyed an economic boom due to the “three 
lows,” i.e., a low-valued won, low crude-oil prices and low international interest 
rates. The depreciated won strengthened the competitiveness of exports and the 
fall of crude oil-prices sharply reduced the cost of imports. In addition, low 
international interest rates reduced the burden of interest payments on foreign 
debt, which stood at $48.8 billion at the end of 1985 (see Okuda [1993]). The 
external current-account balance jumped from a $900 million deficit in 1985 to a 
$14.1 billion surplus in 1988, and the economy averaged annual growth of more 
than 12 percent. 
A major characteristic of the ROK’s industrial policy was that there was little 
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foreign investment, in part because several domestic business groups (chaebol) 
were providing the necessary entrepreneurship, while the country used foreign 
loans to fund industrial development (Japan depended mainly on domestic 
borrowing). However, the ROK’s open use of foreign technology to further 
development differed from methods used by the rest of East Asia. Therefore, 
export-processing zones were not the sole factor in the country’s economic 
development. 
 
5) Maturity (1990 – 1996) 
 
In the early 1990s, the ROK economy slowed down due to three main factors. 
First, the currency appreciated from 809 won to the dollar in 1985 to 760 won in 
1991. Second, wages and prices increased. Third, international trade friction 
arose due to competition with industrialized nations in the fields of consumer 
electronics, automobiles and other goods as the ROK increased its international 
market shares thanks to the “three lows.”  
Although the ROK economy grew under strict regulation, deregulation has 
been an important issue since 1993 (see Ishizaki [1994]). In view of the 
economy’s overdependence on a group-centered structure, the administration of 
President Kim Ybung-sam judged that if deregulation were implemented under 
existing conditions, chaebol domination would strengthen and other companies 
would be put at a greater disadvantage. So the administration devised a plan to 
open up corporate stock ownership wider and spread out ownership of the 
chaebol, as well as to limit inheritance and gift-giving (via public-interest 
corporations), to mitigate corporations’ dependency on borrowing, to limit 
mutual financial guarantees and to limit investment in affiliated companies, 
among other measures (see Mizuno [1993]). 
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Deregulation implemented in 1993 resulted in, for example, construction of 
previously banned plant buildings and liberalization of interest rates in the 
financial field. The ROK is now undergoing a dramatic change from 
regulation-centered industrial policy to deregulation. 
 
E. Taiwan: Toward a Sophisticated Industrial Structure (See Taniura (1988) 
 
1) Import substitution (1950s) 
 
The policy adopted by the government of Taiwan to protect and develop 
industries in its infant stage consisted of high import tariff rates and trade 
regulation. The main targets of protection and promotion were spinning and 
state-owned industries. 
Ten spinning companies, including Chung Shing Textile, Hua Nang Textile 
and Taipei Textile, fled Shanghai and launched operations in Taiwan between 
l949 and 1952. The government enacted a law to promote the spinning industry 
in 1949 and set up the Spinning Panel of the Taiwan District Production 
Operation Management Committee as a promotional organization in 1950. 
Preferential treatment included rationing of raw materials for spun cotton, 
advantageous exchange rates, an outsourcing system (contracting out spinning 
and textile production) and assistance with the procurement of operating funds 
and foreign currency. 
The protected state-owned industries were enterprises that had been sold to 
the private sector under a farmland reform program in 1952 (the owners of these 
enterprises were mainly former landowners). The firms included Taiwan Cement, 
Taiwan Tea and Taiwan Pulp and Paper. 
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2) Export promotion (1960s) 
 
An ordinance to promote exports was put into effect in 1960, giving 
exporters preferential treatment including income tax exemptions for five years, 
permission to remit unlimited overseas profits to Taiwan, expansion of the scope 
of investment from manufacturing into other areas, such as gas and water, and 
acquisition of public and farming lands. U.S. foreign aid to Taiwan was 
discontinued in 1965, creating a need to promote exports and balance Taiwan’s 
external current account. 
To achieve this goal, conditions to set up and manage export-processing 
zones were introduced in 1965. The zones, which offered bonded processing 
with the framework of an industrial park, became the prototype model for 
introducing foreign investment in Asian developing countries. Bonded 
processing exempted firms from import tariffs and other charges on the 
condition that they would export their resulting products. Other preferential 
treatment included permission to possess foreign currency in proportion to the 
value of the exports. 
Foreign investors were allowed to import capital and intermediate goods to 
manufacture products for export, taking advantage of low-cost labor. 
Export-processing zones were set up in Kaohsiung, Taichung and Nanzi. The 
foreign investors were predominantly Japanese and American, and the residents 
in the EPZs mainly manufactured electronic equipment, primary metal and 
chemical products. Japanese companies used the Kaohsiung EPZ for exports to 
third-country destinations, while U.S. firms made products and parts destined for 
parent companies. As a result, exports by foreign-affiliated companies as a 
percentage of Taiwan’s total exports reached 23 percent in 1974 figures (see 
Taniura [1988]). 
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3) Export-oriented import substitution (1970s) 
 
Foreign investment in the early 1970s came mostly from Chin, Japan and the 
United States. Investment by these three countries in 1973 was more than double 
that of the previous year. At the time, Taiwanese industry was mainly small and 
midsized enterprises, andin the early 1970s several small business groups based 
on family-style operations were set up. By 1983, the most successful of these 
groups were Taiwan Plastics, Cathay, Yulong, Taiwan Spinning Co., Tatung, Far 
Eastern, Taiwan Cement and Shinkong Synthetic Fibers Corporation. Among 
them, however, Taiwan Plastics was the only one with a size comparable to 
Taiwan’s state-owned enterprises. 
The worldwide recession induced by the 1973 oil crisis led the Taiwanese 
economy into its first year of no growth in the post-World War II period. In order 
to put the economy back on track, the country’s first six-year plan  introduced 
heavy industrialization as an import substitution policy in 1976. The government 
cut back on preferential measures for excessively labor-intensive industries and 
put emphasis on heavy and chemical industries, including basic industries that 
required large amounts of capital, industries that required high technology and 
industries that were able to boost exports or develop new domestic markets. 
Important preferential measures were implemented in 1977. For instance, the 
starting date for five-year income tax exemptions for capital- and 
technology-intensive industries was extended from two years to three, regardless 
of product launch date. Companies that went public received a 10 percent 
deduction in income tax for three years from the date of public offering. The 
limit on the ratio of internal reserves to unpaid dividends was raised from 50 
percent to 100. Import tariffs on machines and equipment for research and 
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testing were eliminated, and research and testing expenses were treated as 
deductions. Income from inventions and patent rights became tax exempt. 
Meanwhile, certain inefficient heavy industrial and chemical firms, mostly state 
owned, were closed down. 
 
4) Increasingly complex industrial structure (1980s) 
 
The government strengthened selected capital- and technology-intensive 
industries through foreign investment, helping Taiwan to emerge in the 1980s as 
a newly industrialized Asian economy with steadily increasing wages and a 
high-tech industrial base. 
While large corporations in Taiwan tend to sell in the domestic market, small 
and medium size enterprises tend to export, giving them a major role in the 
economy. Taiwanese investment in other foreign countries such as China soared 
from the late 1980s, in part because of the surge in domestic wages. and a 
hollowing out of Taiwanese industries happened. 
Today, investment in high-tech, heavy and chemical industries is rising. The 
government is establishing free-trade/processing zones with centralized facilities 
for research and development, financing and transportation, such as the Tainan 
Science Park City Special Zone. 
 
F. Singapore: Services and High-Tech Industry Promotion 
 
1) Import substitution (late 1950s – 1965) 
 
The government of Singapore formulated a national economic development 
plan (1961-1964) in which laws for industry creation and industry expansion 
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were enacted (1959) to provide a base for investment promotion. The Economic 
Development Board (EDB) was established as the main body to facilitate the 
government’s goals. But the island-state lost an opportunity to expand trade with 
Malaysia following its independence from Malaysia in 1965, so, badly damaged 
by this separation, the Singaporean economy then rebuilt its fortunes by shifting 
from import substitution to export promotion. 
?
2) Export promotion (1966 – early 1970s) 
 
Export-oriented industrialization was implemented by attracting FDI through 
laws advantageous to foreign investors, replacing the two laws enacted in 1959 
to promote import substitution. The new legislation (see Kitamura [1992]) 
included a 1967 law promoting economic expansion by offering preferential tax 
treatment to key industries, and a 1968 employment law that unified, simplified 
and reduced labor conditions. An amended labor-management law in 1968 gave 
labor unions bargaining rights. 
Another measure to stimulate exports expanded the role of government 
through four organizations. The first organization was Jurong Town Corporation, 
which was spun off from the Economic Development Board to become the 
exclusive manager of the Jurong Industrial Park, which successfully attracted 
foreign capital. The second organization was the Development Bank of 
Singapore, which also became independent to serve as the core organization for 
industrial and development financing. 
The third body was the government-owned International Trading Company, 
which promoted exports, imports and third-country trading. The fourth 
“organization” was actually a number of state-owned enterprises in shipbuilding, 
basic metals, chemicals, textiles, food and other industries. Many of these 
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state-owned enterprises became the local partners in joint ventures with foreign 
investors. 
 
3) Capital- and technology-intensive development (late 1970s – early 1980s) 
 
Export promotion improved the employment situation, resulting in 
unemployment falling from more than 7 percent in 1968 to 4 percent in 1974. 
Unemployment thereafter approached zero, so labor supply became very tight 
and the government found itself faced with the task of developing capital- and 
technology-intensive industries. Several policies were implemented to that end. 
First, the National Production Board and Skill Development Fund were set up to 
promote the development and training of human resources required for 
corporations and industries in the new age. Second, the National Wage 
Committee, originally established in 1972 and comprising government officials, 
company managers and representatives from labor unions, was given authority 
to issue recommendations on wage increases. Third, the National Wage 
Committee announced in 1979 a high-wage policy by which average annual 
wage increases could be as high as 20 percent within a three-year period. The 
new wage policy induced labor-intensive foreign capital to withdraw from 
Singapore (for instance, a Japanese company shifted production to Sri Lanka 
and other countries). In retrospect, the policy had a negative effect on the 
economy. 
 
4) Increasingly complex industrial structure (1986 – 1996) 
 
The government set up an economic committee to investigate the factors 
behind the country’s recession and received the committee’s final report in 1986. 
 32
Based on this report, the government decided to create an industrial structure 
based mainly in services, where Singapore enjoyed comparative advantages. The 
policy recognized the economic achievements of neighboring countries and 
Singapore’s limitations in being able to provide labor and infrastructure. 
Specifically, two sectors were designated for investment promotion: first, service 
industries dependent on FDI and expected to drive new growth 
(business/professional, medical, agri-technology, computer and 
experiment/testing services); and second, high-tech industries related to these 
services (electrical, telecommunications, information technology, bioengineering, 
pharmaceuticals, optical, etc.). Overall, Singapore’s economic development has 
been successful, with annual per-capita income rising to more than $10,000. 
 
 
4. Industrial Policy in China 
 
China’s market is large enough that Chinese corporations can follow domestic 
industrial policy and concentrate on domestic sales, yet the government realizes that the 
international competitiveness of Chinese corporations is necessary for them to survive 
in the global market. The government therefore has to balance these two approaches. An 
example is seen in the automobile industry, where China devised the strategy of allying 
domestic corporations with foreign multinationals. Here it could be said that Chinese 
industrial policy is a hybrid of the Japanese government-guided and Asian EPZ models. 
Policies for industrializing China since 1979 have differed from the Japanese model 
due to three reasons: First, in the transition from a planned to market economy, 
state-owned enterprises had to be reformed concurrently to increase their productivity. 
The government attempted to develop a group of enterprises, called “pillar industries,” 
by merging and reorganizing state-owned enterprises in the automobile, machinery, 
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electronics, petrochemical and construction industries. 
Second, foreign investors were invited to help foster domestic industries by 
expanding the domestic capital base and advancing the state of domestic technology. 
Third, support for domestic industries had to be carried out within the framework of 
globalization. The governing principle of the World Bank and IMF is based on market 
competition, and this could not be ignored because China was receiving loans from the 
Work Bank. China’s accession to the WTO was also made conditional to market 
competition, making it difficult to implement protectionist policies, such as high tariffs.  
The banking sector also has had to be reformed concurrently, because of its close 
relationship with the transition to a market economy. The problem is non-performing 
loans, such as those held by the four largest state-owned commercial banks that were 
involved with the socialist “soft-budget” system, whereby loans were provided to 
state-owned enterprises without strict limits. This is why financing for the pillar 
industries must be carried out concurrently while dealing with non-performing loans. 
  
A. Chinese industrialization policy 
 
Industrial policy from 1979 was divided into three periods, as shown in Table 4. 
In 1992 the government introduced the concept of Japanese-style industrial policy 
and by 1997 implementation was in full swing. As described above, this involved 
the restructure of state-owned enterprises and the attraction of foreign capital. 
Developments up to this point are summarized in Table 4. Policy can be classified 
into three major periods: planned economy (1979 to 1986), mixture of planned and 
market economy (1986 to 1992) and market economy I (1992 to 2001) and market 
economy II (from 2001). 
In the planned economy, the government directly controlled all production, 
distribution and consumption. In the planned/market economy the government 
 34
controlled production quantity but not consumption quantity. In the market economy, 
most economic activities have been determined through competition.  
In the first period of the planned economy, the objective was to resolve 
insufficient supply. The government attempted to adjust industrial structure and 
switch emphasis from heavy industries to light industries. The textile industry was a 
typical example. Quality?Quantity? and prices were controlled directly and a 
product allocation coupon system was applied. Quantity control was achieved 
through capital rationing and output quotas. In addition, the government intervened 
to encourage technological innovation. 
This policy was introduced in the sixth five-year plan announced in 1981 and 
started from 1984. However, the effects were limited because the government could 
not give financial support to the targeted industries. From 1987, structural 
adjustment policies were launched to balance demand and supply by reducing 
overcapacity within given industries, so these policies were not designed to foster 
industries. 
The planned/market economy period introduced a market economy and an 
integrated market. The objective was the development of basic sectors such as 
infrastructure and raw materials. Transportation infrastructure, coal, oil and iron and 
steel were targeted in industrial policy. Mergers and reorganizations, as well as the 
introduction of foreign multinationals, were important measures. The term 
“industrial policy” was used for the first time in 1986, in the seventh five-year plan. 
The Industrial Policy Department was established in the National Planning 
Committee in 1988. Leading industries targeted by industrial policy were selected in 
1989. 
The objective in the market economy period has been to foster domestic 
enterprises that could be competitive in international markets. At the same time 
overcapacity created by industrial policies in the first two periods needed to be 
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adjusted or eliminated (this was the rationalization of industrial structure, which we 
will not discuss here). The three main policies of this period have been: 1) 
implementation of industrial policy, 2) reform of state-owned enterprises and 3) 
introduction of foreign capital. The aim has been to create leading industries that 
could serve as a core for new economic growth.  
Industrial policies announced in 1994 designated four leading industries: 
automobiles, electronics and machinery, construction and petrochemicals. Later, 
service industries such as information and housing were added. Industrial policies 
for the machinery and electronic industry were discussed, but the results were not 
made public because of difficulties in the coordination of central and local 
government interests. 
In the reform of state-owned enterprises, the introduction of a modern 
management system was called for in 1992. However, this reform did not proceed 
well and in 1998 Prime Minister Zhu Yong Ji announced a new three-year plan to 
re-implement the reform. Third, from 1992, the introduction of foreign capital began 
to play a critical role in China’s economic growth. In 1996, however, the resulting 
economic boom ran out of steam, so a new list of industries targeted for FDI was 
announced in 1997.  
In contrast, Japanese industrial policy never targeted specific industries for FDI 
because Japan did not rely on foreign investment.  
In the ninth five-year plan starting in 1996, industrial policy focused on 
agriculture, infrastructure, pillar industries and service industries. Pillar industries 
included building materials, housing, petroleum and automobiles. The government 
set 2000 as the target year. Structural adjustment was focused on the textile industry, 
improved quality in the steel industry, and improved profitability in the coal industry 
to reduce excess capacity. Social progress was also targeted. Overall, the 
government hoped industries would accelerate growth and upgrade the nation's 
 36
economic structure.  
At the 15th Communist Party Convention in 1997, the importance of 
international competitiveness was affirmed. A new industrial policy included the 
development of a housing industry. Five major changes were made in industrial 
policy:  
• Balanced supply and demand, instead of just strengthening supply in leading 
industries. 
• More market competition, following many failures due to government 
intervention. 
• De-emphasis of state ownership. 
• More labor mobility. 
• Preferential treatment for SMEs, including the establishment of a financing 
department for this purpose. 
These changes basically encouraged domestic enterprises to become competitive 
with foreign companies in export markets. The government decided that preferential 
treatment was not necessarily needed for state-owned enterprises and that 
distinctions between foreign and local capital were unnecessary. State-owned 
enterprises should be reformed to be competitive with foreign companies. 
The Board of National Affairs held a meeting in June 1997 in which Wu Bangguo 
proposed that the reform of state-owned enterprises should follow the ROK and 
Japanese models by grouping enterprises into conglomerates. But then the Asian 
financial crisis occurred and had a serious impact on Chinese industrial policy. 
Slower growth in Asian countries, particularly the ROK and Japan, forced the 
government to reconsider the plan. 
At the same time the government became aware of the need to implement 
industrial policies with more emphasis on international competition. Therefore, 
policy became more pro-FDI than in Japan. The principle of respecting market 
 37
competition was also emphasized over government intervention. This was a key way 
in which policy contributed to China's industrial development. The issue of 
international competitiveness could not be avoided, and the Chinese government 
was unlikely to continue pursuing the policies that Japan did in the 1950s. Chinese 
industrialization has been based on three basic policies: reform of large state-owned 
enterprises, introduction of FDI in economic development zones and government 
guidance. All three have aimed to make domestic enterprises more competitive with 
foreign enterprises. This shift became clear 1997. 
 
B. Measures for implementing industrial policy 
Industrial policy has been implemented through financing measures, tax 
measures, administrative measures and legal measures. In the early 1990s, the 
emphasis was placed on financing, including low-interest loans, a capital stock 
quota and approval of financial corporations. In the 10th five-year plan and 
industrial policies targeting the 21st century, the Economic and Trade Committee 
started to strengthen tax measures. 
 
1) Financing for leading industries?  
 
The four main state-owned commercial banks provided loans to maximize 
profits and to implement industrial policy. Since these banks were playing an 
important role in industrial policy, it was difficult to privatize the commercial 
banks. For instance, a loan from the Chinese Construction Bank, one of the 
commercial banks, was partly determined by industrial policy. Projects 
guaranteed by the government had priority in receiving loans. However, the 
government did not introduce the "Main Bank System" used in Japan (under this 
system, a company's main bank would provide loans if the company faced 
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financial difficulties). As a result of events during the Asian financial crisis, the 
Chinese government judged that the Main Bank Systems of the ROK and Japan 
were limited in their ability to maximize economic efficiency. 
By the ninth five-year plan, high-technology had become a targeted sector. A 
real estate company (Huasu Group Company) was picked for a national 
scientific project involving measuring instruments and received research funds. 
 A "specific project fund" financed infrastructure projects, such as roads, 
telecommunications and railways. This fund was opened to the manufacturing 
industry in the 1980s to develop the automobile industry. 
 State-owned commercial banks implemented "specific project financing." 
The Planning Committee was mainly involved in the implementation of 
financing and the People's Bank of China, the central bank, also participated in 
these decisions. Approval for such financing made it easier for other banks to 
provide co-financing (in the same way that financing by the Japan Development 
Bank encouraged financing by Japanese commercial banks in the postwar 
period). 
Specific project financing was also available through local governments, a 
system in which local governments would provide and manage funds for 
specific enterprises. The system was abolished with the development of 
commercial banks in 1994. From this point, the quotas once imposed on 
financing gave way to profitability as the main consideration when banks 
extended funds. 
 
2) Foreign exchange rationing 
 
Foreign exchange rationing was effective in the 1980s due to a shortage of 
foreign currency. Under certain conditions foreign exchange rationing 
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effectively supported the importation of capital equipment. However, the 
measure was no longer needed by the mid-1990s, when foreign reserves 
exceeded US$100 billion. 
 
3) Trade policy 
 
In general, trade policy includes tariffs and non-tariff measures, such as 
import quotas. In the case of China, however, effectiveness was limited by 
widespread smuggling. 
 
4) Tax incentives 
 
The effects of preferential taxation were also limited in China. Positive 
effects were seen in coastal areas, economic development zones and state-owned 
high-tech enterprises. For example, favorable treatment was extended to 
companies using consolidated accounting when mergers occurred among the 
some 120 state-owned enterprises in 1994 and 1995. Such treatment included 
the acceptance of specific project funds (mentioned above) as a pre-tax cost. 
 
5) Rationed stock issues 
 
Stock issuances were rationed in accordance with industries targeted by 
industrial policy. Issuances were granted by priority, and changed each year as 
industrial policy evolved. However, since listings were not determined by 
industrial policy alone, the effects of policy were limited. For example, a poor 
performer was not nominated for issuance even if it was in a targeted industry. 
Listings were decided by the National Development Planning Committee, the 
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Economic and Trade Committee and the Security Supervisory Committee. If the 
Security Supervisory Committee was interested mainly in the balance sheet of 
an enterprise, industrial policy was not taken into consideration. 
 
6) Administrative management 
 
Priority for the issuance of licenses was given to enterprises that complied 
with industrial policy. Though this had a positive effect on the development of 
the electronics industry in the 1980s, it had little effect on the refrigeration 
industry. The issuance of number-plate licenses for automobiles was linked to 
industrial policy. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Three main conclusions have been drawn from this study. First, Japan implemented its 
industrial policy to foster domestic companies until the 1960s by protecting them from foreign 
competition. But the government was forced to liberalize the economy and let Japanese 
companies compete internationally due to emerging globalization. The ROK's industrial policy 
was the same as that of Japan, except that companies introduced foreign management methods 
and imported parts and components parts. 
The second conclusion is that most ASEAN countries successfully used export-processing 
zones by offering preferential tax treatment to attract foreign direct investment. The strategy 
faced bottlenecks in human resource development and exporting, however, when the Asian 
financial crisis occurred in 1997. 
 41
Third, Chinese industrial policy is a hybrid of the Japanese and Asian models. The Chinese 
government has fostering domestic corporations by making use of foreign capital and 
managerial skills. International alliances have been a key. 
The lessons from East Asia's experiences are as follows: first, foreign direct investment 
played a crucial role in East Asia's strategy to deal with globalization by developing 
international competitiveness; second, industrial policy does not necessarily have to protect 
domestic firms and instead can leverage the benefits of attracting foreign capital; and third, 
special economic zones such as export-processing zones are a valuable option for any 
government seeking to attract foreign investment. 
Industrial policy both in Japan and ROK imposed high tariffs to protect domestic 
companies from foreign competition. But Japan liberalized its policy in the 1960s and 
the ROK welcomed foreign technology in the 1970s. The ASEAN countries and Taiwan 
established EPZs to attract FDI through preferential treatment, such as tax deductions or 
exemptions. China utilized both methods, government-led industrial policy and EPZs, 
but also used FDI to introduce capital and managerial skills and thereby strengthen 
international competitiveness. This has two key implications. First, the introduction of 
FDI can produce high economic growth in East Asian countries, and conversely, it is 
difficult for countries to grow without FDI. Second, central governments played crucial 
roles in the Japanese, Chinese and Asian strategies for industrial development and 
growth. To enhance aggregate growth in developing countries, governments should 
establish EPZs offering preferential treatment. 
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Table 1. Industrialization Policies in East Asia    
        
?  ?  
Manage- Capital 
ment goods 
?  Period 
?  
Capital 
?  
Technology Parts 
Protection 
required / 
not required
Japan 1945- Domestic 
(LCG) 60 
Domestic Domestic Domestic
Foreign 
Domestic Required 
ROK 1972- 
(LCG) 77 
Domestic Domestic Domestic Foreign Foreign Required 
China 
(Industrial 
policy) 
1992- Domestic
Domestic
Foreign 
Foreign Foreign Foreign Required 
1960- 
70 
Domestic Domestic Domestic Domestic Domestic Required 
1965- Not 
Taiwan  
(SME)  
(EPZ) 
70 
Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign 
Required 
China 
(Economic 
Develop- 
ment Zone) 
1984- Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign 
Not 
Required 
Malaysia Not 
(FTZ) 
1986- Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign 
Required 
        
FTZ: Free trade zones      
EPZ: Export-processing zones      
SME: Small and midsize enterprises    
LCG: Large enterprises      
Source: Prepared by author.      
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Table 2. Japanese Industrial Policy 
 
 I (1945 - 50) II (1950 - 60) III (1960 - 70) IV (1970- ) 
Policy Type Priority production 
Production 
rationalization 
Government–private 
coordination 
Long-range 
planning 
Economic 
System 
Direct control Indirect control Liberalization Liberalization 
Measures 
• Material allocation 
• Recovery financing 
• Price-support 
subsidies 
• Price controls 
• Rationing of imported 
materials 
• Financing 
• Tax incentives 
• Investment 
coordination 
• Production coordination 
• Price coordination 
• Merger and 
reorganization 
• Promotion of machine 
and electronics 
industries 
Deliberation  
councils 
Main 
Targets 
• Coal 
• Iron and steel 
• Iron and steel 
• Power 
• Marine 
transport 
• Iron and steel  
• Petrochemicals 
• Oil refineries 
• Synthetic fibers 
• Machines and 
electronics 
• High 
technology 
  
Sources: Akifumi Kuchiki and Katsuhisa Yamada 
?
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Table 3. Asian EPZ Model (Export-Processing Zones)?
 
Role of government 
 
1. Promotion of international competition 
  a. 100% foreign ownership 
  b. Currency devaluation 
  c. Reduced local-content ratio 
 
2. Market intervention 
  a. Preferential treatment (tax deductions/exemptions for corporate tax, import 
tariffs, etc. 
  b. Financing (including foreign exchange allocations) 
  c. Export duties 
 
 
Characteristics 
 
1. Regionally restricted growth (enclaves), such as 300 ha industrial estates  
2. Areas convenient for exporting (near airports, etc.) 
3. Improved infrastructure within are (power, waterworks and communication) 
 
 
Bottlenecks 
 
1. Supporting (supplier) industries for parts, components, molding, etc. 
2. Human resources (especially skilled workers, managers and engineers) 
3. Infrastructure 
 
 
Preconditions 
 
1. Political stability 
2. Macroeconomic stability 
3. Good internal security 
 
 
Effects 
 
1. Increased employment 
2. Increased exports 
3. Technology transfer 
4. Income inequalities?
 
Source: Prepared by the author. 
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Table 5 Ministries' Share in Japan's General Accounting Budget(1950-1995)  
(percentages)     
     
Fiscal Year 1950 1965 1980 1995
MITI 0.8 1.5 1.5 1.3
Ministry of Finance 15.1 4.2 14.5 22.8
Ministry of Agriculture,Fishery and Forestry 7.7 10.7 8.8 4.3
Ministry of Transportation 3.0 2.6 3.2 1.3
Ministry of Construction 9.6 13.2 10.0 7.9
Ministry of Welfare 5.4 13.8 18.9 19.7
Ministry of Education 2.4 12.5 10.1 7.9
Source: MOF.     
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Table 6. Evolution of MITI's Long-Term Visions (1960–1980) 
      
 1960s (1963)  1970s (1971)  1980s (1980) 
Vision Goals 
Heavy and 
chemical 
industrialization 
?  
Knowledge 
intensification 
?  
Creation and 
vitalization of 
knowledge 
National 
Goals 
Stronger 
international 
competitiveness 
through scale 
 Rich, fulfilling lives  
Contributions to 
international community
 
Stable supply of 
inexpensive basic 
materials 
 
Contribution to 
international peace 
and development 
 
Overcome limitations of 
natural resources and 
energy 
 
Sophisticated light 
industrial products 
for expanded 
exports 
 
Enhancement of 
national creativity 
and dynamism 
 
Coexistence of 
society's clynamism?? 
and higher-quality, 
more comfortable lives 
?  
Reduced friction 
during progressive 
adjustment of 
industrial structure
?  ?  ?  
Technology-based 
nation 
Source: MITI      
 50
Figure 1. Roles of Government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Source: Author 
1. Neoclassical school 2. Market-friendly approach 
3. Functional approach 
4. Industrial policy 
Macroeconomic stability 
Competition law 
Uncontrolled prices 
Human resources 
5. Asian model 
Market competition 
↓ 
private sector 
Government intervention 
↓ 
public sector 
Market competition and government intervention 
↓ 
private sector + public sector 
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Figure 2   Export-oriented and import substitution policies in Asia(1)
19 60 19 70 19 80 19 90
      First 1968 EO  19 80 Second  IS 1986            ???  O
Investment   FTZ Malaysia Heavy Industries            ???Investment Promotion Law (1986)
(1968) Encouragement (1971) Corp. (1980)           ??? Permission for 100??ownership of
Law (1968) (cement,steel,automobile,chemical            ???capital by foreign companies
1960            First  IS 1977   Second IS?EO ?1982
Light industries Investment  Heavy industries       Permission for 100%?ownership of
Encouragement (intermediate good       capital by forign companies (1983)
Law (1972) capital goods),EP (1979)
1966 First IS 1979 19 94
  Heavy industries projects
Selective introduction EPZ(1986) 100%?ownership
of foreign capital         domestic industry protection Structural adjustment policy (1986) of capital by FDI
First IS     1962 EO 1977 EO 1981 1986              EO
Heavy/chemical               Development of Stagnation perioMaturing period
       Consumer goods     Consumer goods Industries knowledgeand    "Three lows"economic boom
(sugar,fertilizer,spinning,         Second IS information     = rise in exports (1986-)
cement and others)     industries
    Intermediate goods
 First IS 1960 EO     Second ?IS 1980 ???EO
     EO
??????Encourageme      ?Heavy/chemical
First IS 1974 1986              EO
Economic Expansion Capital-and    Double incom
      Policy (1979
(1967)
Source : Kuchiki,A.
Note    :IS=import substitution policy,         EO=export-oriented policy
Singapore technology-intensive-type
Electric and heavy industries
      Increasing the share of high value-added sector     
      (non-manufacturing  industries)
         1967                   EO
Launch of the Jurong
         Industrial Park
        Industry Creation Law (196
Ecouragement Law
Development of capital-and technology-intensive indus
as well as small-and medium-sized enterprises for expo
(Encouragement for introduction of foreign investments
specific industries)
??Kaohsiung?EPZ
(1965)
Spinning
???Investment
???Ordinance (1970?
      1972 Second   IS  
   1987       EO
Korea
?????????1970
Taiwan
EO            1989  EO
       Strengthening of
Devaluation of the rupiah (1983,1986)   Permissio
     1972  EO
      ?industrialization (1976)
Malaysia
Thailand
Indonesia
Second  IS    1983
Consumer goods
IS
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